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the state of  
humanitarian funding     
by Peter Walker and Kevin Pepper
For decades an increasing 
percentage of official development 
assistance (ODA) has been spent 
on humanitarian assistance: from 
around 3% in the 1970s to between 
10% and 14% today. In 2005, an 
estimated $18 billion was raised 
by the international community 
for humanitarian assistance. Data 
suggests that although humanitarian 
assistance is still increasing it 
is doing so at a slower rate. If 
the beginning of humanitarian 
reforms was in 2004, humanitarian 
aid is seen to have grown at a 
much higher average annual rate 
during the pre-reform period of 
2000-03 (55% growth rate) than 
it did in the post-reform years 
of 2004-06 (11% growth rate).  
Humanitarian assistance is highly 
concentrated. In 2004, six countries 
received an estimated half of 
humanitarian assistance: Iraq 
(16%), Sudan (11%), Palestine (8%), 
Ethiopia (6%), Afghanistan (6%) and 
DRC (4%). The remaining 53% of 
humanitarian assistance was shared 
among 148 countries. These patterns 
of concentration cannot be explained 
by relative humanitarian need alone. 
The system clearly has a long way to 
go before it approaches impartiality, 
both in terms of how donors allocate 
their funding and where and how 
agencies choose to operate.
Food aid commands the biggest 
share of humanitarian assistance, 
a great deal of it in the form of 
tied food aid. The overall value of 
humanitarian aid falls significantly 
if tied food aid is taken out. Of 
Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) 
appeals between 2000 and 2005, 
$8.6 billion (55%) were allocated 
within the food sector – larger than 
all of the other sectors combined.
DAC – no longer the 
only donor club
A host of new donors have added 
their weight to the traditional 
pool of wealthy, industrialised 
countries linked to the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) of 
the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development 
(OECD). To get the whole picture of 
humanitarian funding it is necessary 
to include funds from governments 
that are not members of the OECD, 
funds channelled through military 
forces for humanitarian-related 
activities, additional diaspora 
remittances responding to crises, 
funds raised from the public by 
NGOs, corporate and foundation 
contributions and the contribution 
of affected states and their 
municipalities. Most of this data is 
either not collected or not collated.
‘Non-traditional,’ ‘non-DAC’ or 
‘emerging’ humanitarian donors 
are starting to support the joint 
mechanisms and codes that have 
recently characterised the traditional 
humanitarian financing system. 
During the Asian tsunami and in 
Lebanon after the Israeli offensive 
new donors made significant 
contributions toward humanitarian 
efforts. Non-DAC donors how 
represent up to 12% of official 
humanitarian financing. They focus 
on humanitarian engagement in 
neighbouring countries, and maintain 
a strong preference for bilateral aid, 
including the Red Cross/Crescent, 
over multilateral mechanisms.
The largest seven or eight 
transnational NGOs deliver 
the lion’s share of emergency 
assistance and in 2004 NGOs were 
responsible for as much as 45% of 
all humanitarian assistance. In 2005 
approximately one-third of the $8.4 
billion state-donor funding ended 
up flowing to NGOs, directly or via 
UN agencies. In addition, NGOs 
received somewhere between $2 
and $5 billion in private donations, 
suggesting that between 48% and 
58% of all known humanitarian 
funding flowed through NGOs.  
Foreign military involvement in 
emergency relief is growing. As an 
example, Commanders’ Emergency 
Response Program (CERP) funding 
for Iraq and Afghanistan1 – deployed 
in the hope of increasing the flow of 
intelligence to the US military – is 
set to reach $456 million in 2007. 
Between 2002 and 2005 USAID’s 
share of US ODA decreased from 
50% to 39%, and the Department of 
Defense’s increased from 6% to 22%. 
As standing armies adjust to fight 
today’s wars, their use of ‘hearts 
and minds’ strategies is more likely 
to grow than shrink. Humanitarian 
agencies need to confront this reality.
Transaction costs
Funding flows along a chain 
of varying length with varying 
percentages of the total being 
retained at each stage. It is 
astonishingly difficult to get accurate 
figures from agencies on these 
transaction costs. A million dollar 
grant from a donor may pass to 
a UN agency, to an international 
NGO, to a local partner and finally 
to the beneficiaries, with each actor 
along the chain taking out a 10% 
overhead. When the beneficiaries get 
only $729,000, can one say that the 
$271,000 in accumulated transaction 
cost has been money well spent? 
The multilayered nature of the 
humanitarian system makes it 
extraordinarily difficult to gauge 
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overall efficiency, and raises a 
fundamental question. In a complex 
system owned by multiple parties, 
who has final accountability for 
safeguarding overall standards 
of efficiency and effectiveness? 
Concerns for sovereignty, mandate 
protection, independence and 
inclusiveness seem to cause donors 
and agencies to shy away from 
tackling system-side issues. The 
donor, UN and NGO reforms of the 
past decade may have improved 
individual components of the 
system but its overall architecture 
is still inherently inefficient.
Financial managers in the field 
point to the practical accounting 
and regulation hindrances which 
make it difficult to move funds 
between UN agencies, to administer 
one rather than multiple auditing 
systems or to have common 
standards for financial reporting. 
In many instances, the barriers to 
effective reform are administrative 
rather than conceptual or political.
Recent reforms 
Around 10% of official humanitarian 
aid is now delivered by new 
mechanisms. Their roll-out has 
illustrated the complications, and 
the gains made, in improving the 
quality of the overall system. 
The Central Emergency Revolving 
Fund (CERF)2 was expanded 
tenfold in 2005 to provide grant 
funding, empower UN agencies 
to respond more rapidly to 
emergencies and address under-
funded crises. The CERF has 
committed more than $426 million 
for more than 510 projects in 44 
countries. The CERF could be a 
mechanism for funding forgotten 
emergencies and crises too small 
or insignificant to hit the radar 
screens of bilateral donors and 
larger NGOs. Yet, so long as only 
3% of funds flow through the 
CERF, its impact will be limited. 
The Common Humanitarian 
Fund (CHF) – piloted in Sudan3 
and DRC in 2006 – is designed 
n
n
to address a critical flaw in the 
Consolidated Appeal Process 
(CAP). The CHFs were set up 
to quickly and flexibly provide 
funds against the CAP and 
allow the UN Humanitarian 
Cooordinator to determine 
resource allocation, working 
closely with cluster/sectoral leads. 
OCHA-managed Emergency 
Response Funds (ERFs)4 seek 
to offer rapidly available small 
grants (up to $130,000) to in-
country organisations (both 
NGOs and UN agencies). ERFs 
have created a more favourable 
relationship between participating 
UN agencies and NGOs. ERF 
advisory boards comprise both 
UN and NGO representatives. 
However, disbursement delays 
have caused frustrations.
Funding according to identified 
need and in proportion to 
priority needs is a core principle 
of humanitarianism, and at the 
top of the Good Humanitarian 
Donorship5 commitments list. Donors, 
recipient agencies, beneficiaries and 
humanitarian personnel have flagged 
a number of key concerns regarding 
the state of humanitarian needs 
assessment. There is a critical dearth 
of hard data, particularly in the early 
stages of rapid onset disasters, to 
support dynamic needs assessment. 
Lack of data creates a self-defeating 
cycle where needs assessments are 
under-resourced by donors, agencies 
are therefore unable to invest in them 
and they lose visibility for donors. 
Donors frequently make decisions 
without consulting each other, and 
collective efforts to pool funding and 
make joint decisions regarding needs 
assessment are viewed as inefficient 
and inimical to rapid service delivery. 
The evidence is not conclusive as to 
whether new UN financing reform 
mechanisms will effectively pool 
funding in an impartial and rapid 
manner and direct them into priority 
needs. There is a concern that these 
new instruments could introduce 
another layer of bureaucracy 
and transaction costs without 
resulting in a clear improvement 
in strategic needs assessment. 
Once again, this takes us back 
to that fundamental question of 
agreeing the legitimate response 
n
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of the international community to 
a humanitarian crisis: a band-aid 
on the symptoms or redress for the 
causes of those symptoms coupled 
with a prescription for reform? These 
are not just issues of definition but 
intensely political ones and it is by no 
means clear that the ‘humanitarian 
community’ can or should come 
to a consensus on the answers. 
With the proliferation of military,  
commercial, state and humanitarian 
interests in crisis management this 
conundrum is growing, rather 
than decreasing, in importance.
Critical questions
Below are what we believe to be the 
more critical questions to ask about 
the humanitarian funding system. For 
each question we provide what we 
think the answer is today plus a brief 
analysis – but not the way forward. 
Question 1: Is global humanitarian 
funding commensurate with global 
humanitarian needs and do we have an 
effective methodology for determining 
humanitarian needs in any one crisis?
Answer: Not really.  
In reality, we have no idea what global 
humanitarian needs are. There are 
just not enough trained and skilled 
people in the right places to collect 
and analyse data. We only know 
what we can measure, so crises that 
are unnoticed or contained within 
a nation state go unrecorded. In 
addition, what we do measure, we 
do in a very imprecise way. Our 
definitions of what constitutes need 
are based on models where crises are 
unexpected, time-limited phenomena. 
An increasing number of crises are 
open-ended and recurrent, involve 
previously marginalised communities 
and constitute a new, if unacceptable, 
normality. The impact of climate 
change, migration patterns and the 
proliferation of small arms will only 
add to this load. In addition, crises 
often left off the ‘humanitarian table’ – 
most notably Israel/Palestine and Iraq 
– have not yet been fully addressed 
by the humanitarian community.
Question 2: Is there enough 
humanitarian funding available?
Answer: Probably not. 
Funding from the DAC donors is 
well-tracked, as is funding through 
the UN system. Funding from private 
donations and foundations into 
NGOs (large and small) is poorly 
tracked outside of each individual 
agency. Diaspora funding to affected 
communities and funding from 
local NGOs and governments of 
conflict/disaster-affected nations 
are largely unknown. We may not 
know how much funding is really 
available but we do know that in 
many crises there is not yet enough 
to allow agencies to reach even 
the minimum agreed standards. 
Question 3: How well do 
we address the volatility of 
humanitarian aid flows? 
Answer: Sporadically. 
We can predict a great deal of the 
humanitarian load but, unfortunately, 
most funding is still reactive. As 
disasters happen, appeals are written 
and funds allocated. There are 
exceptions. The US State Department’s 
Bureau of Population, Refugees 
and Migration makes large annual 
largely un-earmarked contributions 
to ICRC’s and UNHCR’s relief work. 
Many other donors also make un-
earmarked allocations. NGOs are 
concerned, however, that the reform 
mechanisms – CERF, Common Funds 
and ERFs – put them at a greater 
distance from the funding source, 
adding another layer of decision 
making and unpredictability.
Question 4: Is humanitarian 
funding timely?
Answer: No. 
The reactive nature of funding 
systems combined with the 
increased attention paid to financial 
accountability ensures that funds 
flow more slowly through the system 
then we would like. Funding can 
take up to 40 days to be released. 
Question 5: Is humanitarian 
funding flexible enough?
Answer: No. 
The push for greater accountability 
has resulted in substantial funding 
being allocated against RFPs (requests 
for proposals) and in agencies having 
to work against detailed line item 
budgets which form part of their 
contractual agreement with donors. 
There is some evidence that leading 
donors are starting to back away from 
this heavy management approach. 
The reality is that humanitarian 
operations, like military campaigns, 
deviate from their plans from the 
day they start. Agencies report 
that their staff feel constrained to 
programme along the grant-defined 
deliverables even if these – on 
implementation – prove inappropriate. 
Question 6: Do funding mechanisms 
sufficiently serve the differing 
needs of the various humanitarian 
assistance agencies? 
Answer: Unsure. 
Agencies as diverse as ICRC, UNICEF 
and CARE work to different objectives, 
timetables and modus operandi. 
In the search for funding reform 
and consolidation, donors need to 
ensure that they retain the ability 
to fund agencies according to their 
principles and specific strengths.
Question 7: Are funding mechanisms 
sufficiently transparent and 
accountable to their stakeholders, 
including beneficiary groups 
and their nation states?
Answer: Getting better. 
OCHA’s Financial Tracking System 
has greatly increased the transparency 
of aid flows. Transparency of 
decision making involving what 
is essentially a ‘public good’ 
(global humanitarian funding) is 
less well-developed, although the 
growing commitment to beneficiary 
accountability is a welcome move.
We hope that FMR readers will 
take the next step and suggest 
practical actions to move forward 
on each of these issues.
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